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TAX-ASSISTED APPROACHES  




Canadians are not saving for the inevitable costs of drugs and long-term care which 
they will have to pay for out of pocket in their old age, and these costs could potentially 
be financially devastating for them. Later in life, when out-of-pocket health-care costs 
mount, those who previously enjoyed the security of a workplace insurance plan to 
cover such expenses will face a grim financial reality. Many aspects of care for older 
Canadians aren’t covered by this country’s single-payer health-care system. Besides 
prescription drugs, these include management of chronic conditions by ancillary health 
professionals, home care, long-term care, and dental and vision care. 
Statistics show that in 2012, Canadians’ private spending on health care totaled $60 
billion, with private health insurance covering $24.5 billion of that amount. Coverage of 
health-care costs that don’t fall under Medicare’s purview is at present rather piecemeal. 
The non-refundable federal Medical Expense Tax Credit covers expenses only after 
the three-per-cent minimum, or first $2,171, of out-of-pocket costs have been paid by 
the individual. The Disability Tax Credit is available to those with a certified chronic 
disability, and these individuals are eligible for further support via the Registered 
Disability Savings Plan. A Caregiver Tax Credit is also available.
The federal government has a golden opportunity to provide an incentive for 
Canadians to set aside money to pay not only for the often catastrophic medical and 
drug costs that can come with aging, but also to save so they can afford long-term 
care, or purchase private health insurance. Too many Canadians, unfortunately, believe 
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that the federal government picks up the tab for long-term care. In fact, provincial subsidies are 
provided on a means-testing basis, thus leaving many better-off Canadians in the lurch when 
they can no longer live alone and must make the transition to long-term care. 
Providing more generous tax treatment of current and future out-of-pocket health costs, 
including insurance premiums, is an obvious way for the federal government to support 
Canadians to meet their health care needs and improve their well-being. Two existing vehicles 
can play an essential part of this plan. The government can change the currently non-refundable 
Medical Expenses Tax Credit and the refundable Medical Expenses Supplement so that out-of-
pocket health-care costs are eligible from the first dollar. This would place no added burden on 
government if the exemption of employer-provided health benefits from employees’ taxable 
income were removed. 
Making an altered METC available to Canadians who pay their out-of-pocket costs from a 
registered health savings vehicle, which could be created within an RRSP to avoid extra 
administrative burdens, would provide them with an incentive to save. They could then either 
self-insure for future out-of-pocket health costs, or purchase private health insurance. A grant 
component could be added for lower-income families to make such savings incentives more 
widely diffuse.
Treating health benefits as taxable income subject to the modified Medical Expenses Tax Credit 
would address efficiency and equity issues with the existing tax treatments of health-care costs 
while extending tax assistance for out-of-pocket costs to more of the population. When the 
onus for decision making about payments and insurance purchases is placed on consumers, 
cost containment in health care and quality improvement incentives naturally follow.
1An aging Canadian population is confronting a situation where more of its health-care 
needs fall outside the coverage of the Medicare basket – single-payer public coverage 
of physician and hospital services. Management of chronic conditions by non-physician 
providers, prescription medications, home care, long-term care, vision care and dental 
care all represent rising costs for aging individuals at a time when their personal incomes, 
and availability of third-party private health insurance, are generally declining due to 
withdrawal from paid employment. Compounding this problem is the likely reduction in 
the generosity of Medicare coverage of medical treatment costs associated with physician 
care and hospital-based services, as more services are moved out of the hospital setting and 
more health-care needs are met by non-physician providers. 
It could be desirable to have Canadians save more while working to meet these out-of-
pocket non-Medicare expenses and the federal government could play a role in providing 
incentives for Canadians to save for the costs of meeting some of their own health-care 
needs.1 More ambitious proposals call for compulsory collective savings approaches 
through payroll tax-financed benefits along the lines of the Canada Pension Plan.2 These 
proposals really amount to an increase in taxes, albeit designated for increased incomes 
at higher ages and/or covering health-care costs. Alternatively, it is worth considering 
following the lead of other tax-supported voluntary savings schemes like registered 
retirement savings plans (RRSPs), tax-free savings accounts (TFSAs), registered education 
savings plans (RESPs) for post-secondary education and the Registered Disability 
Savings Plan (RDSP) for meeting disabled Canadians’ care needs. RRSPs and TFSAs 
offer incentives for saving generally to increase a household’s capacity to meet future 
health-care costs, along with other needs like income in retirement. The RESP and RDSP 
were established to support families and individuals to address the higher costs of post-
secondary education following the shift to higher fees, and to address the future care needs 
of disabled persons. The RRSP model has also been modified to allow for borrowing the 
principal from the RRSP to pay for a house down payment or to cover post-secondary 
education costs. Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 21) propose that a similar accommodation 
with RRSPs could be made for meeting the costs of long-term care (LTC) whereby some 
portion of RRSPs could be transferred tax free at the time of retirement to be used for the 
purchase of LTC insurance. Presumably, similar accommodations could be introduced for 
out-of-pocket health-care costs. 
Our study explores the potential for the federal government to use tax-supported measures 
to help Canadians meet out-of-pocket health-care costs. First, we will review the existing 
tax-support measures for health-care costs, including the tax deductibility of medical 
expenses and tax-exempt employment-based coverage of health-care costs. We will present 
1 
The problem of out-of-pocket health-care expenses and the sufficiency of retirement savings and retirement income is an 
identified concern for retirees and near-retirees. Particular concerns include being in long-term care longer than they are 
financially prepared for and not having sufficient health-care coverage or ability to afford nursing or assisted-living care. 
http://business.financialpost.com/2015/02/04/were-not-prepared-health-care-shockers-threaten-yourretirement/ A BMO 
Wealth Institute report found only 27% of Canadians 50 and over who were surveyed have purchased additional health 
insurance. Fourteen per cent said they planned to buy health insurance. Fifty-nine per cent said they did not have or intend 
to buy health insurance. 
2 
See Ontario’s policy to introduce the Ontario Retirement Pension Plan, mandatory for workers who do not have a company 
pension plan, in 2017, or Quebec’s proposed autonomy insurance to address out-of-pocket costs for meeting care needs (for 
example, see http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/health/whyquebecs-shift-in-home-care-policy-is-
important/article15982867/ ) 
2statistics on the extent of coverage of the population, the amounts of coverage typically 
provided, and assess what the current arrangements are not addressing in terms of health-
care costs. Second, we will describe several models for a potential registered health-care 
savings plan (RHSP) that arise from existing tax-supported savings accounts in Canada, 
including RRSPs, TFSAs, RESPs and the RDSP. Third, we will be interested in assessing 
whether the creation of a new savings vehicle, e.g., a registered health-care savings plan 
(RHSP), would be preferable to modifying the terms and conditions of existing vehicles like 
the RRSP or the TFSA. We will need to consider whether a tax-assisted savings account 
would be a complement to, or substitute for, existing tax-supported private insurance 
which includes health-spending accounts; whether the proposed tax-supported savings 
vehicle will be targeted, or perhaps grant-supported like an RESP or RDSP, to increase the 
extent of uptake, particularly among the non-employed or low-income groups with limited 
capacity to save. For example, one could imagine an income-contingent annual grant where 
government saves on behalf of low-income Canadians. We will consider how to define what 
will be covered and conditions under which funds can be withdrawn from the account, how 
it could be administered and other logistical issues that we identify through our research. 
Finally, we will evaluate the costs of the four savings vehicle options against the projected 
impact that they would have for meeting Canadians’ out-of-pocket health-care needs. 
OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS FOR HEALTH CARE 
The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) (2005, 6) defines out-of-pocket 
payments as costs directly met by consumers. CIHI identifies three categories for grouping 
out-of-pocket payments. First, direct payment refers to payments for goods and services 
that are not covered by any form of pre-payment insurance, including public insurance. 
Cost sharing (or co-payments) refers to payments where the consumer pays for part of the 
costs of goods or services received. Finally, informal payments are unofficial or “under the 
table” payments for goods and services. 
CIHI (2014, 37-40) reported that in 2012, private spending on health care in Canada was 
$60 billion, roughly 30 per cent of all health-care spending. Private health-insurance 
payments were $24.5 billion of that amount, while $29 billion were covered by Canadians 
paying out of pocket.3 Non-consumption spending accounted for the remaining balance 
of $6.5 billion.4 The biggest categories of expenditure by insurance companies were 
drugs ($10 billion), dental care ($7 billion), administration ($3.7 billion) and hospital 
accommodation ($1.5 billion). The most important categories for out-of-pocket costs 
were prescribed drugs ($6.4 billion), dental care ($4.7 billion), nursing homes and other 
institutions ($6 billion), vision care ($2.6 billion), over-the-counter drugs ($2.9 billion) and 
personal health supplies ($2 billion). 
3 These expenditures out of pocket and from insurance have almost doubled in nominal terms since 2002. CIHI, Exploring 
the 70/30 Split: How Canada’s Health System is Financed, 37, reported that in 2002, private spending on health care in 
Canada was $34 billion, roughly 30% of all health-care spending. Private health-insurance payments were $14 billion of 
that amount.
4 
CIHI, Ibid., 6, defines non-consumption expenditures as including donations to hospitals, parking lots, investments and 
other sources. Jeremiah Hurley and G. Emmanuel Guindon, Private Health Insurance in Canada, 9, describe “non-
consumption spending” as including non-patient revenues to hospitals (ancillary operations, donations, investment income), 
expenditures on research and capital expenditure in the private sector. 
3Sanmartin, Hennessy, Lu and Law (2014) use Survey of Household Spending data to 
examine trends in out-of-pocket health care spending between 1997 and 2009. For the 
median-income household, expenditures on dental, drugs and health-care premiums 
represent 70 per cent of total out-of-pocket expenditures. They show that the median 
household in Canada in 2009 had out-of-pocket health-care expenditures of just under 
$2,000 (four per cent of after-tax income), up from $1,450 (3.5 per cent of after-tax income) 
in 1997 (2009 purchasing power). Out-of-pocket health-care expenditures increase with 
income level and age, but represent a smaller share of income as income rises, and a smaller 
share of total health-care spending for seniors. Sanmartin et al. find that out-of-pocket 
health-care expenditures as a percentage of after-tax income increased for households in 
all income quintiles, but the increase was greatest for households in the lowest income 
quintile. In 2009, the average out-of-pocket health spending in the highest income quintile 
was almost $3,000, compared to an average of $1,000 for households in the lowest income 
quintile. Over 40 per cent of households in the lowest income quintile spent more than five 
per cent of after-tax income on out-of-pocket health-care costs in 2009, compared to only 14 
per cent of households in the highest income quintile.
For seniors, the out-of-pocket expenditures may be three times higher than for non-seniors 
(<65 years of age) (Health Canada, Health Expenditures by Age and Sex, 1980-81 to 
2000-01). For 2001, using a different data source than the Statistics Canada study, in 2009 
purchasing power, per capita private-sector expenditures on hospitals, other institutions, 
physicians, other professionals, drugs, home care and other expenditures were $1,093 for 
all age groups. Those expenditures were $801 for Canadians younger than age 65 and 
$2,710 for Canadians 65 and over. These per capita numbers are comparable to the average 
expenditures for third quintile households in the 2001 SHS, excluding expenditures on 
health-care premiums, presented by Sanmartin et al. 
Finally, it is important to note that the preceding statistics are for current out-of-pocket 
expenditures on health care and do not include the non-insured future health-care liabilities 
of individuals. For example, households without sufficient savings or third-party insurance 
coverage for long-term care, critical-illness care or drug coverage, all face risks of high 
costs in these spending categories that are not accounted for in household budgets. In 
the case of long-term care, Blomqvist and Busby (2014) report that the average cost per 
recipient is around $60,000, 3/4 of which is covered by provincial payers, leaving $15,000 in 
annual out-of-pocket costs.5 More Canadians require home-care services for more of their 
lifespans, which are mostly covered out of pocket. Formal home-care costs are $18,000 per 
year per recipient and informal home-care costs often provided by family members have 
been valued at $21,000 per year. As most households lack sufficient savings and pension-
plan provisions to meet even income needs, and as most households do not have insurance 
coverage for long-term care, these are costs that could arise which are not supported by an 
expected funding source.
5 Åke Blomqvist and Colin Busby, Paying for the Boomers, 4, report that stays in institutional LTC are typically after age 
75 and can last two to four years. For conditions like Alzheimer’s and other dementia, LTC costs can deplete entire wealth 
holdings.
4TAX SUPPORTS FOR HELPING FAMILIES COVER HEALTH-CARE EXPENSES 
The largest tax-supported arrangement for households to meet private health-care costs 
is the tax treatment of health benefits provided to employees. According to Hurley 
and Guindon (2008, 24), the federal government and all provincial governments allow 
employers to deduct the cost of health benefits provided to employees when corporate taxes 
are levied. The federal government, and all provinces except Quebec, exclude the value of 
health benefits provided through employment from taxable income.6 The projected value 
of this tax expenditure for the non-taxation of business-paid health and dental benefits is 
$3.4 billion for 20127 which is roughly equal to the 2012 expenditures on administration for 
private health and dental insurance in Canada and around 14 per cent of total private health-
insurance expenditures in 2012. 
Private health-insurance coverage accounts for around 12 per cent of all health spending 
in Canada and around 45 per cent of all private health spending. Hurley and Guindon 
(2008, 15-22) estimate that “a large majority of Canadians hold some form of private health 
insurance” and the majority of this coverage is for workers and their families who are 
covered by employer-sponsored plans.8 Private insurance coverage is most common for 
workers in large firms, with full-time rather than part-time work, with higher wages, and in 
unionized workplaces. Extended health-care insurance, which covers services not publicly 
insured, including hospital services, prescription drugs, non-physician providers, vision 
care, travel insurance and other miscellaneous services, is the most commonly provided 
6 See Mark Stabile, Private Insurance Subsidies and Public Health Care Markets, Table 1, and Amy Finkelstein, The Effect 
of Tax Subsidies, Table 1, for estimates of the tax prices of employer health and dental coverage in Quebec versus the 
other nine provinces. According to Hurley and Guindon , a number of provincial governments have attempted to remove 
this tax provision as late as 1994. Only Quebec in 1993 succeeded. Hurley and Guindon report that most provinces as of 
2008 levied a premium tax of 2% to 4% of premium costs incurred by employers. This is not exactly what these payroll 
taxes are. Ontario’s employer health tax (http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/tax/eht/) and Manitoba’s health and post-secondary 
education tax levy (http://www.gov.mb.ca/finance/taxation/taxes/payroll.html) are taxes on employer payroll over an 
exemption limit. The payroll on which the taxes are based includes wages, salaries and benefits, but in neither Manitoba nor 
Ontario are health benefits directly tied to the tax. The only link of these payroll taxes to employer contributions to health 
benefits is really an indirect one as the tax is largely levied on larger-payroll employers where health benefits are most 
commonly provided. Finkelstein, Ibid., 311, in her calculations of tax prices of employer-provided health benefits, accounts 
for consumption tax through premium and sales taxes that are applied to group health-insurance benefits but not to other 
services an employee could purchase.
7 
Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2012, http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2012/
taxexp1201-eng.asp. It is interesting to note that the projected tax expenditures for 2012 of $3.4 billion are substantially 
higher than the projected $1.995 billion for 2012 in the 2013 projections. It turns out that the 2013 projections reflect the 
tax expenditure that would occur if employer health benefits were treated as taxable income but subject to the Medical 
Expenses Tax Credit discussed below. So the 2013 projection is not based on the policy at this time. Footnote 23 reads: “The 
methodology used to calculate this tax expenditure was changed to assume that employer-paid health premiums would 
be eligible for the Medical Expenses Tax Credit if they were taxable.” Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures 
and Evaluations 2013 http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2013/taxexp1301-eng.asp#toc. 2014 projections from Finance 
show similar tax expenditure of non-taxation of employer health benefits to 2013, but there is no footnote describing if the 
methodology is the same as 2013. See http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2014/taxexp1401-eng.asp#toc7 
8 
Around 60% of workers and their families have coverage through employer-sponsored plans; 26% of retirees over age 65 
have coverage through an employer-sponsored plan. Individually purchased private insurance coverage is relatively rare. 
Stabile reports that in 1998, 68% of full-time workers in Canada had private health-insurance coverage.
5private insurance coverage in Canada.9 Dental coverage is also provided in many group 
insurance contracts. Many Canadians also have private insurance coverage for long-term 
disability, accidental death and dismemberment. 
The two private insurance products that have not had much uptake are long-term care 
insurance and critical-illness insurance. These products appear to have no representation 
in employment-based group insurance coverage, leaving them to individuals to purchase 
(Hurley and Guindon 2008, 18, Table 5). Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 19-20) suggest 
that the low uptake of these insurance contracts is attributable to Canadians’ widespread 
mistaken belief that long-term care is already covered by the government. They also argue 
that the targeted subsidies for long-term care that the provinces do provide are means-tested 
in a way that co-payments for home care or institutionalized care are greater if individuals 
have insurance coverage than if they do not. This crowding out of private insurance 
coverage benefits reduces the demand for LTC insurance. Consequently, LTC insurance 
will tend to be bought by individuals and families with high income and assets that they 
wish to preserve and pass on to later generations.
Targeted public payment for non-Medicare services is provided by the provinces to address 
the needs of families reliant on social assistance and Canadians aged 65 and over. For 
drugs, the provinces provide some coverage for persons aged 65 and over, and for persons 
on social assistance (CIHI 2008, Hurley and Guindon 2008, Busby and Pedde 2014). For 
other non-Medicare expenses like dental, vision and rehabilitation services, provinces 
provide targeted coverage, usually based on income or social assistance receipt. Where 
premiums are levied, they are not necessarily tax exempt.10 Deductibles and co-payments 
may be incurred. 
The Medical Expenses Tax Credit (METC) provides a non-refundable tax credit for persons 
who have sustained “substantial” medical expenses for themselves or certain of their 
dependants.11 The METC reduces taxes owed by the amount of allowable medical expenses 
minus the lesser of $2,171 or three per cent of net income, times 15 per cent, the lowest 
9 
Other services can include relatively flexible health-spending plans (HSPs) which define a maximum amount per year for 
which allowable health expenses can be reimbursed. HSPs can include provisions for unspent amounts to carry forward and 
even rolled over into instruments like RRSPs. 
10 If they are levied as part of the provincial health insurance or hospital insurance schemes, they are paid out of after-tax 
income of the individual. If the individuals pay premiums through a third-party insurer like Blue Cross, then the premiums 
could be eligible for the Medical Expenses Tax Credit. See Canada Revenue Agency Medical and Disability-Related 
Information 2014 http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/rc4064/rc4064-14e.pdf 
11 
Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Folio S1-F1-C1: Medical Expenses Tax Credit (Effective as of Sept. 3)  
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/tchncl/ncmtx/fls/s1/f1/s1-f1-c1-eng.html#N111E5 See also Canada Revenue Agency Medical 
and Disability-Related Information 2014 http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/rc4064/rc406414e.pdf) 
6tax rate.12 This amount is not dependent on employment status, and since 2011, there is no 
cap on expenses eligible for the METC. The federal tax expenditure for the METC was 
projected to be $1.425 billion in 2014.13
FIGURE 1 TAXES PAID ON INCOME USED FOR OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE COSTS BY INCOME LEVEL
Figure 1 illustrates how the Medical Expenses Tax Credit influences federal taxes paid on 
income used to meet eligible out-of-pocket health costs by income level. For comparison, 
consider that employment-based health benefits are effectively an expenditure from income 
where no tax is paid (red dashed line). The $35,000 income earner facing a 15 per cent 
federal income-tax rate pays 15 per cent tax on the income needed to cover out-of-pocket 
health-care costs up to three per cent of their income, $1,050, after which they pay no tax 
on the incremental expenditure above that threshold. At the higher income levels, they 
pay the applicable tax rate for their income up to $2,171 of health-care costs, above which 
incremental expenditures are taxed at net of their federal tax rate less 15 per cent for the 
METC. 
12 
Medical expenses above 5% of income were deductible for the purposes of determining taxable income from at least 1942. 
Malcolm G. Taylor, Financial Aspects of Health Insurance, 33-34, notes that the 3% of income threshold dates from 1953 
when it was lowered from 4% of income. The tax treatment in the 1950s was not as a non-refundable tax credit; it was a 
deduction of medical expenses from taxable income at a time when the effective marginal tax rate was 18%. Taylor noted 
that the limitations of the tax deductibility of medical expenses included no relief for health costs below the threshold, no 
benefit for those who pay no tax and a benefit that grows in value with the taxable income of the household, resulting in 
some regressivity. 
13 
Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2014 http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2014/
taxexp1401-eng.asp#toc7. 
7Low-income individuals aged 18 or older (income, including that of co-habiting spouse 
or common-law partner less than $25,278 for 2013 and indexed annually) with earnings 
or business income of at least $3,333 in 2013 (and indexed annually) are eligible for the 
refundable Medical Expenses Supplement. Calculated on the same basis as the Medical 
Expenses Tax Credit, the maximum value of the supplement for a given year is $1,142 for 
2013 (indexed annually), and reduced five per cent of the excess of adjusted income over 
$25,278. 
There are two other non-refundable tax credits related to out-of-pocket health-care needs 
for Canadians with a medically certified long-term disability – the Disability Tax Credit 
and the Caregiver Tax Credit.14 Further financial support is available to Canadians eligible 
for the Disability Tax Credit to invest in meeting future income and care needs through the 
Registered Disability Savings Plan. The projected 2014 federal tax expenditure on these 
credits is $0.75 billion for the Disability Tax Credit and about $0.1 billion for caregiver 
credits. 
It is also important to recognize that health-care services provided by a range of 
professionals, medical devices and products, prescription drugs and hospital parking are 
GST/HST-exempt.15 The GST-exemption tax expenditure of these items is projected to be 
$2.44 billion in 2014.16
Tax assistance for meeting health-care costs should also be considered in terms of supports 
for income and savings vehicles, including one’s principal residence. From one perspective, 
many of the out-of-pocket expenses for health-care needs reflect age-related increases in the 
cost of living, distinct from short-term budget shocks of an acute health event. As such, the 
challenge of meeting higher expected health-care expenses after age 65 can be addressed 
by strategies aimed at enhancing income in retirement or wealth (Blomqvist and Busby 
2014, 21). The non-refundable age credit is a maximum of $6,196 for 2014 federal taxes for 
Canadians born in 1949 or earlier. This income-tested credit is not directly tied to health, 
but provides tax relief, hence more after-tax income to seniors with a net income of less 
than $35,000 who would be expected to have higher health-care needs. The projected tax 
expenditure on the age credit for 2014 is $2.955 billion.
Pension plans through the workplace, RRSPs, TFSAs and non-taxable treatment of capital 
gains on one’s principal residence are all examples of tax support for improving incomes 
and wealth at older ages that allow Canadians to meet their out-of-pocket health-care costs. 
14 
There is also a Disability Supports Deduction that provides a non-refundable tax credit for expenses incurred for the 
disabled individual to work or operate a business. The Children’s Fitness Tax Credit and the Disability Tax Credit are also 
listed as tax expenditures on health: http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2013/taxexp1301-eng.asp#toc9 
15 
For a list of GST/HST-exempt items, see Schedule VI (Subsection 123(1)) Zero-Rated Supplies of the Excise Tax Act  
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/e-15/page-330.html#h-161 . For a discussion of exempt health-care services see: 
http://www.thehstblog.com/2011/06/articles/health-care-sector/canada-revenue-agency-provides-list-of-exempt-and-
taxable-health-care-service-providers/ . For Quebec’s treatment under QST, see http://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/salle-
de-presse/nouvelles-fiscales/2012/2012-04-04.aspx . See also, Andre Picard, Tax on tampons is sexist and illogical, The 
Globe and Mail, March 10, 2015, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/tax-on-tampons-is-sexist-and-illogical/
article23383379/ 
16 
Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2014 http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2014/
taxexp1401-eng.asp#toc7. 
8A recent Financial Post article recognized that to meet the often very high costs of long-
term care, Canadians will out of necessity rely on their house equity to cover those costs.17 
WHAT SHOULD BE COVERED THROUGH A TAX-ASSISTED SAVINGS VEHICLE? 
Answering this question requires consideration of three issues. First, what kind of 
expenditures require, or are suitable for, self-insurance through savings or current income 
versus pooling of risks through insurance contracts? Second, what health-care costs are 
currently not addressed through some form of favourable tax treatment or third-party or 
government coverage? Third, what health-care expenses should be eligible for favourable 
tax treatment? 
At this time in Canada, it would appear that the use of a tax-assisted savings vehicle should 
be considered for meeting gaps in other forms of coverage of out-of-pocket costs. The need 
is for meeting first-dollar costs up to the thresholds where favourable tax treatment or other 
public coverage currently exists, and for addressing co-payments and other features of 
private insurance that leave households with out-of-pocket costs. For the larger catastrophic 
costs like long-term care, the discussion should be around how to extend insurance 
coverage for this contingency to more of the population, which could include using tax 
assistance to create incentives for the purchase of private insurance contracts. 
What kinds of costs are suitable for self-insurance out of current income or 
a savings vehicle? 
Savings as a source of self-insurance is an appropriate vehicle for smaller, predictable costs 
and perhaps for larger expected, but predictable costs. A savings vehicle for meeting out-
of-pocket health-care costs should not be designed to meet catastrophic costs. However, for 
the costs of getting an extra bath per week in long-term care or other services, savings can 
be a useful tool to augment whatever insurance coverage is already held. For infrequent, 
potentially catastrophic health-care costs, pooling risks through insurance contracts is more 
appropriate.18 For example, Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 15) identify the large potential 
gains from risk pooling to meet the costs of LTC. They note that the annual average 
LTC costs across all individuals in Canada ($1,930 per capita total spending) suggest a 
manageable cost, but the financial burden is not evenly distributed in the population: “Only 
17 
Housing equity in a principal residence is also a source of finance for meeting out-of-pocket health expenses, particularly 
of the catastrophic variety. See Blomqvist and Busby, 19, and ‘We’re not prepared’: Health care shockers threaten 
your retirement, Financial Post, Feb. 4, 2015. http://business.financialpost.com/2015/02/04/were-not-prepared-health-
careshockers-threaten-your-retirement/ 
18 
See Raisa B. Deber, Kenneth C. K. Lam and Leslie L. Roos, Four Flavours of Health Expenditure, for a discussion of four 
categories of health-care expenditures and the appropriate methods of finance for them. See Blomqvist and Busby, 14-15, 
for a discussion of why long-term care costs are suited to risk pooling/insurance finance. Indeed, this is not within the scope 
of the discussion in this paper, but public coverage is largely used for small, regular health-care costs like the basic doctor’s 
office visit, rather than larger, less predictable costs like long-term care. Victor Fuchs, From Bismarck to Woodcock, 
describes the choice to use public coverage for shallow coverage of a broad array of predictable smaller expenses, rather 
than deeper coverage of infrequent catastrophic losses, as representing an irrational use of insurance. However, using 
savings to cover the shallow costs to which current income and savings might be suited to shift coverage to catastrophic 
costs not associated with physician services or hospital-based care would require completely redesigning Canadian 
Medicare and likely eliminating the accessibility condition of the 1984 Canada Health Act.
9a minority will ever receive LTC in an institution, and many will die after only a relatively 
short period of illness. But for the minority who do need LTC for a long time, whether in an 
institution or at home, the financial burden can be very large.”19
Who needs assistance covering out-of-pocket costs? 
The gap in coverage or capacity to pay for out-of-pocket health costs would seem to be 
for non-disabled retired persons, self-employed persons who opt not to purchase third-
party insurance coverage, and persons not employed or working in arrangements without 
health-care benefits. Disabled Canadians, Canadians with low incomes or dependent on 
social assistance from provinces, and Canadians 65 and over will have some coverage 
for non-Medicare expenses for drugs, vision, dental and home care. In some cases, the 
coverage terms are stipulated and known while in others, coverage may be provided on a 
discretionary basis. Co-payments are often required and in the case of drugs, and possibly 
dental care, it is believed that the co-payments result in eligible individuals facing a barrier 
to taking advantage of the coverage that they have. 
How can we define what out-of-pocket costs are eligible for tax assistance? 
A pragmatic approach would be to define eligible health-care expenses allowable for 
favourable federal tax treatment to be the expenses currently eligible for the Medical 
Expenses Tax Credit and currently covered under employment-based health spending 
accounts. Having the coverage match current employer-provided benefits would simplify 
transition health-cost coverage from employment to non-employment. As with the non-
refundable tax credit and the health-spending plans, all claims must be supported by 
receipts. Eligible expenses should only be expenses not covered by private health-benefit 
plans and those beyond coverage limits of private health-services plans. 
There are categories of products and services in the realm of health promotion and 
chronic disease prevention that cannot be claimed against the METC. Health programs 
presumably not provided by the approved list of health-service providers, and vitamins and 
supplements, even if prescribed by a medical practitioner, may be worth adding to the list 
of claimable items for the METC, to balance the favourable tax treatment of treating and 
curative health care, in the interests of improving population health and preventing chronic 
diseases.
Finally, provincial health-care premiums are not eligible for the Medical Expenses Tax 
Credit. When employers pay the premiums for employees, the premiums are considered a 
taxable benefit. British Columbia and Ontario have health-care premiums and it is possible 
that more revenue-constrained provincial governments may start to rely on health-care 
19 
Long-term care costs can be as high as $150,000 per year, which would require considerable savings and assets to meet.  
In contrast, an insurance contract of $2,100 per year for long-term care coverage provides $52,000 in annual benefit.  
Based on numbers in ‘We’re not prepared’: Health care shockers threaten your retirement, Financial Post Feb. 4, 2015  
http://business.financialpost.com/2015/02/04/were-not-prepared-health-careshockers-threaten-your-retirement/ 
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premiums for revenue. It might be worth considering making these premiums eligible as an 
allowable cost for a tax-assisted savings vehicle.20 
How much coverage do people need for meeting out-of-pocket  
health-care costs? 
There are at least two possible approaches to setting the amount that can be part of annual 
expenditures on out-of-pocket health costs eligible for favourable tax treatment. First, and 
perhaps simplest, is to choose some value, as is currently done with the employment-based 
health-spending accounts – e.g., $750, $800, $1,000 or more. Indeed, one could just recreate 
the health-spending account structure within a tax-assisted savings vehicle. The second 
way would be to assess the expected out-of-pocket health-care costs, perhaps by age, and 
use that to set an annual allotment for eligible costs. This amount could be age-adjusted to 
reflect higher needs at higher ages. The former approach has appeal in that the budgetary 
impact is defined so long as expenditures must be incurred in the tax year and not carried 
over to subsequent years. The latter approach may be better for meeting the levels of needs, 
but could be far more costly to provide and it will still not fund the full levels of needs. 
It is important to recognize that to an extent, the contingency of high out-of-pocket costs 
is already addressed by the medical expenses tax deduction and provincial coverage for 
those in need. The METC provides some tax relief for substantial health-care costs. Further, 
governments typically do provide some relief for more catastrophic levels of health-care 
costs following traumatic events like a stroke. Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 13) discuss how 
provincial governments guarantee access to LTC services according to an individual’s 
ability to pay. As discussed above, even if there is not sufficient coverage for meeting the 
high-cost health-care needs, you would not necessarily want to use a savings vehicle to 
cover the residual uncovered costs. Pooling through insurance is the more sensible approach 
for a society to take. 
WAYS IN WHICH FEDERAL TAX ASSISTANCE CAN SUPPORT CANADIANS IN 
MEETING OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH COSTS 
There are several ways in which tax assistance could encourage greater capacity of 
households to meet out-of-pocket health expenses. First, tax treatment of these expenditures 
can be addressed to reduce the costs. That is, tax treatment can be used to provide relief to 
households incurring these costs. Second, to make purchases of private health insurance 
more affordable, tax treatment of health-care premiums can be used to create incentives for 
households to purchase contracts to indemnify the losses. Third, tax treatment of health-
care costs can be structured to provide incentives for households to save more to improve 
their capacity to meet out-of-pocket health-care costs. This approach could also be part of 
20 
Premiums for government health-insurance programs are not eligible for the Medical Expenses Tax Credit in 2014. 
Canada Revenue Agency, Medical and Disability-Related Information 2014, RC4064(E) Rev. 14. Page lists “provincial and 
territorial plans such as the Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan and the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (for a complete list 
of non-eligible plans, go to www.cra.gc.ca/medical)” as expenses that cannot be claimed using the Medical Expenses Tax 
Credit. 
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an attempt to address other issues around ensuring the adequacy of retirement incomes or 
the efficiency of the tax treatment of health-care costs. 
Tax relief 
Perhaps the simplest way to address predictable out-of-pocket health-care costs would 
be to treat the first $E (e.g., $1,000) of allowable medical expenses to be eligible for the 
METC. Because health-care expenditures that are greater than the minimum of three per 
cent of income or $2,171 are already subject to favourable tax treatment under the Medical 
Expenses Tax Credit21, the need is for some vehicle to cover the expenses below this 
threshold – some or all of the first minimum{$2,171, three per cent of income} worth of 
expenditures. For example, if the first $1,000 of health-care expenses were to be METC-
eligible, then that would result in a $150 non-refundable tax credit (15 per cent). Eliminating 
the threshold for the METC entirely would create a maximum non-refundable tax credit of 
$326 for the first $2,171 of out-of-pocket health-care costs. 
One consideration that can arise with this change is the administrative burden or cost of 
expanding a credit for receipt-supported expenditures with more health-care expenditures 
for the credit and a potentially large number of receipts to be scrutinized for a much larger 
number of claimants. It is uncertain what the added administration cost would be, but one 
solution would be to unconditionally give a health-expense amount towards non-refundable 
tax credits to all tax filers to account for expected, uncovered out-of-pocket costs. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it is not actually tied to health needs or health-care 
use. 
Creating incentives for purchasing insurance
Another approach to supporting households in making choices to address out-of-pocket 
health-care costs is for governments to consider introducing incentives for individuals 
without employer-provided coverage to purchase private health-insurance coverage. For 
example, making the first $1,000, or first $2,171, of out-of-pocket health spending eligible 
for the METC, with private health-insurance premiums as eligible expenses, would reduce 
the effective cost of private insurance coverage. 
Alternatively, a larger subsidy could be provided by extending the non-taxable treatment 
of employee health and dental benefits to all individuals. Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 21) 
propose a targeted variant of the tax-exempt treatment of long-term care insurance. They 
suggest that Canada should consider a proposal in the U.K., where the income-tax system 
has similar tax deferral and exemption provisions to Canada, to allow a tax-free, lump-sum 
pension transfer taken at retirement that could be used to purchase LTC insurance.
Other incentives for insurance purchase include mandates for purchase. For example, in 
1997, Quebec introduced a compulsory prescription-drug insurance plan using a social 
insurance model that achieved universal coverage through a mixture of private insurance 
plans, largely employment-based, and a public plan (see Hurley and Guindon 2008, Box 1,  
21 Caregiver costs are addressed with the Caregiver Tax Credit. 
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page 12). In Australia in 1997, under the Private Health Insurance Incentives Scheme, a 
one-per-cent medical levy surcharge was applied to taxpayers with incomes greater than 
$50,000 (singles) or $100,000 (families) and who opted not to purchase private health 
insurance (typical premium of $1,800 (Butler 2002). 
It is not at all clear that these types of tax-supported incentives for private health-insurance 
coverage by individuals are effective for increasing uptake of the coverage. Stabile (2001) 
finds that the tax-price elasticity of employer-provided health insurance ranges from 
-0.3 to -0.6, with dental coverage showing greater tax-price sensitivity. Using Stabile’s 
estimates, in 1995, if Ontario, with the lowest tax price for employer health benefits 
followed Quebec and included employer health benefits in taxable income, the probability 
of holding supplemental health insurance would be 10 percentage points lower. Finkelstein 
(2002), in examining the change in employer-provided health benefits in Quebec relative 
to other provinces after the benefits were no longer excluded from taxable income, found 
the tax-price elasticity of employer health coverage was -0.5. She found that the reduction 
in tax subsidy with the 1993 change in tax treatment of employer-provided health benefits 
coincided with a 13- to 14-percentage point decrease in workplace coverage, of which 
maybe one percentage was offset by increases in purchases of insurance in the non-group 
market. The decrease in employer coverage was most pronounced in small firms where the 
subsidy through tax treatment is more critical than for large firms. Greater scale economies 
for insurance associated with larger pools of employees with compulsory participation 
in a group plan allow for lower premium costs than for individuals purchasing the same 
coverage on a voluntary basis.
In Australia, the one-per-cent medical surcharge levy led to some negative tax expenditure 
but was ineffective for increasing the extent of private health-insurance coverage. 
Subsequently, the Australian government introduced a direct 30-per-cent subsidy for 
purchase of private health insurance. Butler (2002) describes how this policy had only a 
small impact on uptake of private insurance and amounted to annual tax expenditure of 
around $1 billion in 2000/01, suggesting that private health insurance has inelastic demand. 
Aside from the uncertainty over the effectiveness of subsidies for private health-insurance 
purchases by individuals, other considerations reduce the appeal of focusing on only 
increasing private insurance purchases. First, according to CIHI (2005), Canada already has 
very high reliance on private health insurance compared to other OECD countries. To the 
extent that this could reflect the high effective subsidy to private coverage through Canada’s 
favourable tax treatment of employer-provided health and dental benefits, it is not clear how 
much higher the extent of coverage can go. 
Second, there is a case to be made that extending private health-insurance coverage for 
extended health benefits does not address Canadians’ emerging needs. According to Hurley 
and Guindon (2008, 26), the usual coverage for extended health benefits in Canada is 
structured to provide shallow coverage of health-care costs. The policies cover occasional 
use of providers of routine services as opposed to covering the costs of “regular, on-going, 
more intensive care.” In other words, extended health benefits provided through private 
health insurance tend to cover modest and predictable health-care costs which could be met 
through self-insurance via savings or current income. 
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If incentives are to be created for insurance purchases, then they should be for the purchase 
of coverage for catastrophic health-care costs associated with drugs or long-term care. 
Purchases of these insurance contracts have not been widespread, even though many of the 
challenges and liabilities for provincial governments are related to these needs in an aging 
population. Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 21) propose that Canada follow the lead of other 
countries and use favourable tax treatment of retirement savings to create incentives for the 
purchase of long-term care insurance.
HOW BIG ARE THE INCENTIVES IF WE CHANGE THE METC? 
Given the tax treatment of health-insurance premiums and out-of-pocket health-care 
expenses under the METC, we can consider how the METC provides relief and/or 
incentives to purchase private insurance coverage. To show this, we consider four scenarios 
for the treatment of out-of-pocket health-care expenses. The first two we consider are 
illustrations of the status quo tax treatment of health-care expenses in Canada. 
First, consider the tax treatment of health-care benefits obtained through employment. Let 
E=out-of-pocket health expense ($); t% is federal tax rate for person with income I. As a 
non-taxable benefit, there are no taxes paid on the E dollars of health-care benefit for the 
employee:
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑= 0% ∙ 𝐸𝐸 
Next, for out-of-pocket costs not covered by employment-based coverage, we have E 
covered with after-tax income with the tax credit provided for “substantial health-care 
costs.” Note this would be the tax treatment for employment-based benefits if the tax 
treatment of employee health benefits were changed to make health benefits to be taxable. 
So if E is a taxable benefit, or after-tax income is used for medical expenses:
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ൌ𝑡𝑡% ∙ 𝐸𝐸− 15% ∙ ሺ𝐸𝐸− 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{3% ∙ 𝐼𝐼ǡʹͳ͹ͳሽǡͲሻ 
Consider two alterations to the Medical Expenses Tax Credit that would apply to any out-
of-pocket costs for eligible health expenditures. First, the first $1,000 of out-of-pocket costs 
could be added as eligible for the METC: 
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ൌ𝑡𝑡% ∙ 𝐸𝐸− 15% ∙ (min{𝐸𝐸ǡͳͲͲͲሽ൅𝑚𝑚ሼ𝐸𝐸− 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{3% ∙ 𝐼𝐼ǡʹͳ͹ͳሽǡͲሽሻ 
Second, all out-of-pocket costs from the first dollar are METC-eligible:
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ൌ𝑡𝑡% ∙ 𝐸𝐸− 15% ∙ 𝐸𝐸 
Figure 2 illustrates the taxes paid on income used to cover out-of-pocket health-care costs 
for a tax filer subjected to the highest federal tax rate of 29 per cent (federal taxable income 
> $136,270). For tax filers with health and dental benefits fully covered through their 
workplace benefits, there would be no taxes paid on the health-care spending (green line 
is on horizontal axis). Obviously, compared to the non-taxable treatment of employment-
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based health benefits, treatment of health benefits as taxable, or having persons use after-
tax income to cover health-care costs, results in more in tax paid on income (red line). 
Allowing the first $1,000 of E to be METC-eligible drops taxes paid on income to meet 
those expenses in almost half (29 per cent-15 per cent) (black dashed line). Making all 
out-of-pocket health-care costs METC-eligible provides sizeable, and growing, reductions 
in taxes paid up to $2,171 in expenses, above which the tax reduction compared to the 
status quo is fixed in size (dashed blue line). The size of tax relief under the more generous 
treatment of out-of-pocket health-care costs is 14 per cent of expenditures below $1,000, or 
$2,171. While the dollar values of taxes paid differ for persons with taxable income greater 
than $43,953 and less than $87,907 (22 per cent federal rate) and greater than $87,907 and 
less than $136,270 (26 per cent federal rate), qualitatively, the picture in Figure 1 holds for 
these income levels. There is a very different impact, however, for Canadians with taxable 
incomes below $43,953 (15 per cent federal rate). 
Figure 3 shows the taxes paid on income used for out-of-pocket health-care expenses for 
Canadians who face this lowest federal tax rate. If these Canadians have taxes owing, 
they only pay 15 per cent on the first $1,000 of health-care expenses covered with taxable 
income. That amount owing in tax is fixed for all expenditures $1,000 or greater. If the 
first $1,000 of health-care costs were METC-eligible, then no tax would be paid on income 
used to cover the first $1,000, but the effectively lump-sum payment would be borne once 
expenditures surpassed the METC threshold. Making out-of-pocket costs first-dollar 
eligible for the METC would result in these persons paying no tax on income needed for 
covering out-of-pocket health-care costs. This change would address the current regressive 
feature of the METC where the first three per cent of income worth of expenses are not 
claimable. This means that taxes owing on the income used for as much as $1,050 of out-
of-pocket health-care costs are a larger share of income for low-income households than for 
the higher-income households facing higher tax rates. Making the first $1,000 of health-care 
costs, or all out-of-pocket health-care costs, METC-eligible would remove this regressive 
feature of the METC threshold. 
Some thought may need to be given to whether persons with tax-exempt employment-based 
coverage for health costs should be eligible for these revised treatments. Employer-provided 
coverage is already a big source of disparity in health-care coverage and adding more 
favourable treatment of out-of-pocket costs for those with employer-based coverage would 
potentially increase the size of the disparity. 
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FIGURE 2 TAXES PAYABLE FOR INCOME USED FOR OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE EXPENSES,  
  29% FEDERAL TAX RATE 2014 (TAXABLE INCOME > $136,270)
FIGURE 3 TAXES PAYABLE FOR INCOME USED FOR OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE EXPENSES,  
  15% FEDERAL TAX RATE 2014 (TAXABLE INCOME $35,000)
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SAVINGS AND INCOME STRATEGIES 
The preceding discussion has not distinguished among sources of income that are used 
to meet out-of-pocket health-care costs beyond expenses covered through employment 
health benefits. If an objective of tax assistance for meeting out-of-pocket health costs is to 
encourage households to save so as to have more income to meet these costs, particularly 
beyond employment-based coverage, then the preceding modifications to the tax treatment 
of income used for meeting health costs could be restricted to income drawn from savings 
vehicles like an RRSP or a TFSA. In the case of tax assistance through savings vehicles, 
several issues must be considered. First, would savings be from before-tax income like the 
RRSP or would they be from after-tax income like a TFSA? Second, is it necessary to have 
a new, dedicated vehicle for health savings (e.g., a registered health savings plan (RHSP)) or 
can the health savings be accommodated within existing tax-assisted savings vehicles? 
Suppose that the METC treatment for the first $E of receipt-supported out-of-pocket 
health-care costs were provided only if the individual withdraws the $E from a registered 
savings vehicle.22 Where the earlier discussion of the extension of the METC eligibility 
did not stipulate which income sources are eligible for use to pay for out-of-pocket health-
care costs, with a savings approach the expenses cannot be out of current income. They 
must be paid for out of savings. The point of this stipulation would be that the favourable 
tax treatment of withdrawals from savings to meet health-care costs would create an 
incentive to save, with the byproduct of savings not being needed for health-care costs 
retained by the saver for other income needs. Without this favourable tax treatment of 
withdrawals for health-care purposes, there is no incentive to save beyond those in place 
already which include non-taxable gains in the savings account. There would also need to 
be some imposition of a maturation or waiting period before which funds can be withdrawn 
for covering out-of-pocket health costs to ensure that costs are met out of savings and not 
current income merely flowing through an account. Savings for health-care purposes could 
have deposits up to a ceiling which could accumulate and earn interest. 
The next issue to consider is whether deposits to savings accounts for health purposes 
should be from before-tax income as with an RRSP, or from after-tax income as with an 
RESP, RDSP or TFSA. The current tax treatment of employer-provided health-care benefits 
has the benefits provided from before-tax income (non-taxable benefit of the employee) 
which would be the RRSP approach. In contrast, if health benefits from the workplace were 
treated as taxable, then after-tax income saved in an RESP, RDSP or TFSA would be the 
equivalent model. 
With the RRSP model, consideration must be given to whether there would be an increase 
in the limit of what can be contributed per year to raise the potential savings amount, or 
whether the use of RRSPs for tax-exempt medical costs would encourage more people 
to contribute to RRSPs and contribute their full amount. A study from 1995 showed that 
22 
This tax treatment of health-care costs is less generous than seen currently with employer-provided health-care benefits, 
but is more in line with proposed tax treatment for employee health benefits discussed above. Indeed, if a larger incentive 
is needed, then the $E withdrawn for health-care cost purposes could be directly deducted from taxable income. Should 
the monies be withdrawn for non-medical purposes, then they could be taxed according to the same basis as an RRSP 
withdrawal or repaid to the RRSP. Indeed, a condition for withdrawal could be that the funds be first rolled into an RRSP 
out of the RHSP.
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only 30 per cent of annual RRSP room was being used, suggesting that there is ample 
contribution room for most Canadians to save for health-cost coverage within the existing 
limits. The stock of unused RRSP contribution room in Canada is $500 billion in 2012 
(Globe and Mail, Aug. 23, 2012) so on the surface, it would seem there is not a strong case 
for increasing the contribution limit. On the other hand, much of the unused RRSP room 
may be for Canadians who face lower tax rates (e.g., young workers) or higher rates on 
withdrawal due to growing income.23 Their interests may be addressed by the TFSA which 
has a $5,500 annual contribution limit and a cumulative contribution room of $41,500.24 For 
higher income households who have contributed their full RRSP contribution limit, there 
may be a case for adding contribution room. 
Next, is it necessary to create a dedicated savings vehicle for health-care costs, or would it 
be better to incorporate provisions for withdrawing savings for health costs from existing 
vehicles like RRSPs or TFSAs? A separate, dedicated savings vehicle for health-care costs 
has the disadvantage of adding complexity to the tax-supported savings system, which will 
likely mean added administration costs. 
An RHSP could be created within the RRSP along the lines seen for home buyers and 
lifelong learning plans, where RRSPs could be withdrawn/borrowed against for these 
specific purposes with no tax at the time of withdrawal, but tax on the unpaid scheduled 
repayments. With the RHSP model, no repayment would be required, but there would be 
allowance for a withdrawal for medical expenses that would be treated according to the 
modified METC discussed above, or perhaps not taxed at all. Some consideration would 
need to be made whether the withdrawal reduces RRSP contribution room as with non-
repaid withdrawals from the lifelong learner’s plan or the home buyer’s plan, or if the 
withdrawn amount is returned as contribution room. 
Blomqvist and Busby (2014, 21) suggest that a transfer of RRSP funds into a vehicle like 
an RHSP instead of transfer of funds into a RRIF at age 71 could provide an RESP-like 
vehicle for the elderly where the taxable withdrawals for LTC and perhaps other out-of-
pocket health-care costs would be deferred to age 75 and after. 
With the TFSA, because contributions are from after-tax income, withdrawals are not 
taxable, so the main advantage to savers would be favourable tax treatment of health costs 
met with funds withdrawn from the TFSA in addition to the non-taxation of the investment 
income on the TFSA funds. For the favourable tax treatment of $E of health costs, the 
taxpayer would need to withdraw that amount from a TFSA. To an extent, this TFSA 
withdrawal requirement would make liquidation of savings a necessary condition for the 
favourable tax treatment of health-care expenses. 
If there were a desire to include a grant component to encourage savings for meeting 
health-care costs, then a dedicated health-savings vehicle as with the RESP and the RDSP, 
23 Noreen Rasbach, TFSA or RRSP? Here’s How to Decide, The Globe and Mail, Feb. 10, 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/globe-investor/personal-finance/retirement-rrsps/tfsa-or-rrsp-it-depends/article16792559/ 
24 
Clare O’Hara, Liberals Detail How They Will Roll Back TFSA Contribution Limits, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 7, 2015.  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/personal-finance/household-finances/liberals-confirm-rollback-of-tfsa-
limit-in-2016/article27638448/ Frances Woolley, How TFSAs fit Harper’s Vision of Small Government, The Globe and 
Mail, Feb. 25, 2015. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/how-tfsas-fit-harpers-vision-of-small-government/
article23195077/
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the RHSP could be structured as a separate savings account. With the RRSP it is possible, 
but more complicated, since determining at the end of the account what had not been spent 
on health would be more complex. The Registered Disability Savings Plan has income-
contingent grants and bonds that could provide a model for health-care cost coverage. 
Depending on family income, contributors to an RDSP are eligible for up $3,500 in annual 
grants for $1,500 in contributions, and up to a further $1,000 in the RDSP through the 
Canada Disability Savings Bond for family incomes less than $25,256. The lifetime (to age 
49) maximum grant amount is $70,000, and the maximum bond amount is $20,000. The 
RDSP is based on eligibility defined by eligibility for the Disability Tax Credit, which in 
turn is based on having a medically certified disability. The RESP for helping families meet 
the costs of post-secondary education provides $500 per year for $2,500 in contributions. 
The maximum grant for contributions made by the eligible dependant’s 18th birthday is 
$7,500. 
For an RHSP with a grant component for low-income individuals, there are two possible 
ways to structure the grant or bond component. First, if the Canada Disability Savings 
Bond were extended to be a Canadian health-savings bond, eligible for deposit in either an 
RHSP or RDSP, then for low-income families, $1,000 per year could be deposited up to a 
lifetime maximum of $20,000. Second, the Medical Expenses Supplement is currently a 
refundable tax benefit for low-income tax filers (family income less than $25,278 in 2013) 
with a maximum value of $1,142. If the METC were changed to have first dollar of health-
care costs eligible, then the refundable Medical Expenses Supplement could be the source 
of the grant for the RHSP – the refundable monies must be deposited in the RHSP.25 A 
disadvantage to this approach is that low-income Canadians who are not incurring health-
care expenses would not have deposits. Second, for low-income households, they may need/
prefer to have more income now than having savings reserved for meeting health expenses.
It is not clear how tax assistance for out-of-pocket health-care costs would influence 
savings behaviour. Even with a very large grant component, of 500,000 Canadians who 
would be eligible for an RDSP, only 69,000 as of 2013 had contributed to one.26 In a recent 
evaluation of the proposal to double the annual contribution limit for TFSAs, based on a 
cursory review of the literature, the Parliamentary Budget Office makes the assumption that 
preferential tax treatment of savings does not induce greater levels of savings. Instead, the 
tax-preferred vehicles divert savings from other savings vehicles without as favourable tax 
treatment (Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer 2015, 7-8). It is possible, however, 
that the METC treatment of TFSA withdrawals for health-care expenses as an additional 
incentive to save, would increase the levels of savings by Canadian households.
COSTING SOME POLICY OPTIONS
To provide some best guesses for the tax expenditures of the federal government associated 
with changing the tax treatment of employee health and dental benefits and changing 
25 
During World War II, refundable tax credits were used as a form of compulsory saving. The funds were payable at the end 




the parameters of the METC to make first dollars of expenditures eligible, we used the 
SPSD/M based on 2009 data and we reviewed the 2012 to 2013 changes in the Department 
of Finance’s projected tax expenditure on employee health and dental benefits.
A challenge with using the SPSD/M for evaluating changes in the METC is that not all 
Canadians would have had high enough out-of-pocket health costs to benefit from the 
METC, hence they may not have reported their out-of-pocket health-care expenditures. 
So, if all we did was change the threshold for expense eligibility, we would only have 
the tax expenditure change for persons who have higher expenditures and miss much of 
the population with low annual expenditures. Consequently, we assign all individuals in 
the data set at least $1,000 of eligible out-of-pocket health spending. This assumption is 
conservative relative to the magnitude of median expenditures on out-of-pocket health-
care costs discussed earlier. On the other hand, if out-of-pocket health-care costs are not 
uniformly distributed across the population, we may be overstating the change in METC 
tax expenditures since higher health costs would have been eligible already. 
Table 1 presents some options for the tax treatment of health benefits and out-of-pocket 
health costs under some of the scenarios discussed above. We do not specify income 
sources in terms of whether current income or income from savings is used to meet the 
expenses, since for savings or spending out of after-tax income, the income source would 
not matter. It is important to consider, however, that restricting the favourable tax treatment 
of out-of-pocket health-care expenses to funds withdrawn from savings would likely result 
in lower tax expenditures than we calculate, since many households will have low, or no, 
balances in savings vehicles. 
First, consider the tax treatment of employer health benefits, which are a non-taxable form 
of income, and the benefits of the coverage are also not counted in taxable income. As noted 
earlier, the Department of Finance projected federal tax expenditure of this tax treatment of 
employee health and dental benefits in 2013 to be $2 billion, whereas it was $3.4 billion in 
the 2012 projections.27 Because the 2013, and later 2014, projections by the Department of 
Finance treat employee health and dental benefits as taxable but eligible for the METC, the 
difference between the 2012 and 2013 projected tax expenditures suggests that the federal 
government would collect an additional $1.4 billion in tax if the benefits were to be treated 
as taxable income but eligible for the status quo of the METC. 
Next, we consider the tax expenditure under the status quo of the METC using the SPSD/M 
with 2009 data. The projected tax expenditure for the status quo of the METC in 2014 was 
$1.425 billion. If we were to make the first $1,000 of health expenditures eligible for the 
METC, then the federal tax expenditure would increase by $1.54 billion , assuming that all 
tax filers who had zero claimed health expenses actually had $1,000 in out-of-pocket health 
costs (around the average for Canadians). Eliminating the METC threshold of three per cent 
of income for expenses would increase the total METC tax spend by $2.36 billion. 
27 
It appears that this net amount is after accounting for revenue that would be collected if the benefits were taxable and 
subject to the METC.
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TABLE 1 OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL TAX ASSISTANCE TO MEET OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH COSTS 
Policy Federal Tax Expenditure
Employee health benefits Not taxed (Status quo 2014) $3.4 billion
Out-of-pocket costs Taxable but eligible for METC (Status quo 2014) $1.425 billion
Policy Change in federal tax expenditure
Employee health benefits Taxable but eligible for METC on all dollars (2014) -$1.4 billion
Out-of-pocket costs Taxable but eligible for modified METC, first $1,000 
eligible
+$1.54 billion
Out-of-pocket costs Taxable but eligible for METC, first $2,171 eligible +$2.36 billion
NOTE: The status quo tax expenditures are from Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2012 
and 2013 (http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2013/taxexp1301-eng.asp#toc9). The changes in federal tax expenditure 
are generated with the SPSD/M for changes in the METC. See the Appendix for the details on how these numbers were 
calculated.
DISCUSSION 
Given that there currently exists favourable tax treatment for insurance vehicles for 
covering out-of-pocket health-care costs, the desirability of a tax-assisted savings vehicle 
should be considered in terms of the program’s goals. Consider that it is already possible 
for employers to purchase private health insurance on behalf of employees, effectively with 
employee before-tax income and have non-taxable benefits when costs are reimbursed. 
If this treatment were extended to any purchase of private health and dental insurance 
by individuals and not only through employment arrangements, then private insurance 
coverage could be extended over more of the population. Another expenditure-based 
approach might simply be to lower the tax-deductibility threshold for the Medical Expenses 
Tax Credit to be first-dollar deductible. Is the issue one of making insurance contracts lower 
cost, or out-of-pocket costs more affordable, through tax assistance? Or is the idea not only 
to meet out-of-pocket expenses today as insurance contracts are designed to do, but to meet 
health-care costs of the future and to encourage greater savings to improve the adequacy of 
income for meeting health care and other needs? 
The desirability of a tax-assisted savings plan to provide for some degree of self-insurance  
of out-of-pocket health-care costs can be considered in terms of efficiency considerations.  
Evans (2004, 147-148) discusses the belief that the generosity of the subsidy of private  
insurance contracts through employment contracts results in over-insurance and overuse of  
health care; unnecessarily “high administrative overhead costs” of insurance; restrictions of 
coverage to those who represent “good risks” or to those with mandatory pooling through  
place of employment, and finally, limits the public pressure for public coverage of drugs and 
other out-of-pocket expenses. Hurley and Guindon (2008, 29-30) argue that private insurers  
largely function as passive “bill payers” which has resulted in no efforts, or stimulus  
towards, improvements in the quality and efficiency of health-care services in Canada.  
Where costs of services have increased, insurers have largely responded by relying more  
on demand-side cost sharing. Stabile (2001) finds that employment-based health benefits  
lead to increased use of physician services. Using his estimates, it would appear that there 
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is a one-per-cent increase in use of publicly funded physician services attributable to the 
favourable tax treatment of employment-based health benefits.28 
From the perspective of providing incentives for quality and efficiency in health-care 
services, self-insurance through one’s own savings or through structures akin to a 
medical savings account where households are allocated an annual sum of money, either 
through government grants or through favourable tax treatment such as tax exemptions of 
contributions, potentially offers a way to offset these negative features of tax-subsidized 
insurance purchases. Self-insurance where unspent balances are retained by the individual, 
if not needed, creates an opportunity cost of the funds that would provide an incentive for 
individuals to avoid unnecessary expenditures and to potentially be more price-conscious 
when procuring services.29 
A savings vehicle for meeting out-of-pocket health costs may not be well timed for 
addressing the needs of the baby boom generation. For the lead edge of the baby boom who 
are 65 years old already, the capacity to save and take advantage of a savings instrument 
may not be great.30 For them the main advantage would be the relief that comes with more 
favourable tax treatment of health expenses, even if they use RRSP and TFSA balances to 
do so. For Canadians aged 50 to 65, these instruments may be of considerable value, given 
that they are still working and at peak earnings. A great advantage may be offered for 
younger Canadians as well, given the likely increases in tax rates that will accompany the 
increase in tax expenditures on health care and pensions with the aging of the baby boom 
generation. 
Could the introduction of a tax-assisted savings vehicle for out-of-pocket health-care 
costs be a first step towards improving the efficiency and equity of the tax system? If the 
introduction of a tax-assisted savings vehicle substituted for the favourable tax treatment 
of employee health and dental benefits, then the net tax expenditure for the savings vehicle 
would be lower, the tax treatment of health-care costs would be closer to efficient, and 
horizontal equity would be improved. Further, the favourable tax treatment of extended 
health benefits is largely a legacy of a tax policy introduced to address the costs of 
hospitalization and medical treatment. 
The exclusion of employer-provided health benefits from taxable income was introduced 
in 1948 by the federal government at a time of rising extents of unionization and union 
28 Based on the marginal effect of the tax prices between Ontario and Quebec yielding a 10 percentage point difference in 
the probability of having employment-based coverage and a 10% increase in physician use for those with private health 
coverage compared to those with no coverage.
29 While commentators such as Robert G. Evans, Financing Health Care; Evelyn Forget, Deber and Roos, Financing Medical 
Savings Accounts; Hurley, Medical Savings Accounts: Approach With Caution; and Deber, Medical Savings Accounts: 
A Fine Idea Unless You’re Sick, have been critical of medical savings-account approaches to covering Medicare services 
(doctors and hospitals), their concerns are largely over the effective user fees they would introduce and the incidence of 
those fees in terms of those in poor health. For non-Medicare services currently met out of pocket, these concerns are not 
relevant unless one is concerned that only higher-income households stand to benefit from the favourable tax treatment.
30 
Blomqvist and Busby, 67, would disagree with this concern. They argue that the timing is such that many baby boomers still 
have a decade to adjust savings and income plans to account for retirement needs plus long-term care costs. Long-term care 
costs are predominantly expected after age 75 whereas other out-of-pocket costs rise after age 65 coincident with needs and 
loss of employment-based coverage.
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bargaining power in the private sector.31 At the time, this favourable tax treatment of 
health benefits supported an expansion of coverage of voluntary insurance coverage for 
hospitalization and medical treatment, particularly physician services. This encouragement 
of voluntary insurance coverage through insurers like Blue Cross and Blue Shield was 
an alternative to a compulsory public insurance plan that would follow later in 1957 (for 
hospitals) and 1965 (physician services) (Taylor 1957, Naylor 1986, Boychuk 2008, Emery 
2010). As the federal conditions for cost sharing of medical services in hospital and/or 
provided by a physician resulted in public payers taking over payment and administration 
for these health expenditures, private insurance moved into a complementary insurance role 
covering expenditure categories on the outside of Medicare and covering some of the gaps 
that Medicare may have left (Naylor 1986, 167). To some extent, this legacy has committed 
financial resources of households to coverage of out-of-pocket costs for needs of working-
age Canadians and their families, possibly at the expense of meeting the expected needs 
at higher ages like drugs, long-term care and home care. Finally, the inequities in the tax 
treatment of private insurance based on who pays the premium (employer or the individual) 
has long been a criticism of tax support for voluntary insurance coverage. Malcolm 
Taylor (1957, 35) identified early on that the favourable tax treatment of private insurance 
premiums covered by one’s employer provided a large advantage over persons who did not 
have access to employer-provided coverage.
In the 1981 federal budget, then-Finance minister Allan MacEachen proposed to end 
the tax exemption for a number of benefits provided to employees, including employer 
contributions to private health-service plans and dental plans on behalf of employees, 
effective Jan. 1, 1982. MacEachen said that “the tax-free status of these benefits is 
inequitable for employees who cannot receive them, and encourages the substitution of 
these benefits for taxable forms of remuneration for no particular business purpose but 
at a cost to the federal treasury. The tax exemption for these benefits is also concentrated 
in the larger corporations since employees of small businesses typically receive most 
of their remuneration in the form of wages and salaries which are fully taxable.” The 
proposed changes would have resulted in employer contributions to private health-service 
plans and dental plans on behalf of employees being treated in the same way as employer 
contributions to government health-insurance plans where, as a taxable benefit, the 
contributions to private health-insurance plans would be counted as part of the employee’s 
medical expenses which are deductible to the extent they exceed three per cent of his/her 
income. This proposal was just one of many never enacted in the end from the extremely 
unpopular 1981 budget. Opposition from stakeholders like the insurance industry was 
alleged to have been strong. 
31 
The timing of 1948 coincides with the passing of the Income Tax Act that replaced the legislation for a wartime income 
tax and with the 1948 Industrial Relations and Disputes Act. This timing is five years later than in the U.S., suggesting 
different reasons for having the exemption. For the U.S., Jill Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured, 50, discusses how employer 
contributions to private health plans and pension plans were exempted from the calculation of profit, and how they would 
not be counted as income for the employee, and were implemented during World War II. The former was to address 
concerns of firms with the excess profits tax of 80% to 90% on corporate profits higher than pre-war levels to prevent 
wartime profiteering. The latter arose due to the no-strike provisions of unions limiting their ability to demand higher 
wages. The 1943 National War Labor Board decision not to treat health and pension benefits as part of income encouraged 
bargaining over benefits in collective agreements instead of wages. Canada also had a wartime excess profits tax and life 
insurance premiums and compulsory savings were exempt from taxable income, but not health benefits until 1948. The 1945 
federal White Paper on Employment and Income discussed the need to restrain consumption in the aftermath of the war to 
avoid price inflation and to ensure resources were directed at investment. Perhaps the encouragement of non-wage benefits 
instead of wage increases was considered useful for that purpose.
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Since 1993, Quebec has included employer-provided health insurance in taxable income 
(Stabile 2001, Finkelstein 2002). If the rest of Canada were to follow Quebec, what 
would the impacts on private health-insurance coverage be? With no change in the 
METC, Finkelstein (2002) found that coincident with the change in the tax treatment of 
employment-based health benefits, supplementary health-insurance coverage fell on net 
between 10 and 15 percentage points. Stabile’s (2001) estimates suggest that the impact 
of including employer health and dental benefits in taxable income would reduce the 
probability of having coverage by around 10 percentage points. If the METC were changed 
to make all out-of-pocket costs METC-eligible, then the impact on private insurance 
coverage is less clear. It could fall by a lesser amount or even increase. For income earners 
in the lowest tax bracket, if all out-of-pocket expenses were METC-eligible, then there 
would be little change in the tax price of private health and dental benefits. For the highest-
income earners, the METC treatment of out-of-pocket costs would cut the increase in the 
tax price of health and dental benefits estimated by Stabile and Finkelstein by 50 per cent. 
To the extent that the METC treatment of first-dollar out-of-pocket costs would be extended 
to more of the population, it is possible that this introduction of a subsidy to Canadians 
without employment-based coverage would result in an increase in demand for private 
insurance coverage. 
Consider that in Table 1, the elimination of the treatment of employee health benefits as 
not taxable would almost offset the costs of making at least the first $1,000 of out-of-
pocket health-care expenses eligible for the METC. This would broaden the favourable 
tax treatment of out-of-pocket health costs beyond workplace coverage to the population 
and equalize the treatment of health-care costs across sources of coverage. The broader 
treatment of health-care spending would reduce the strong incentive to purchase employer-
based extended health-care coverage in favour of purchasing other insurance products like 
long-term care insurance.
CONCLUSIONS
At this time, there is a lack of tax assistance for individuals without workplace health 
benefits to meet the first $2,171 of out-of-pocket expenses, including insurance premiums. 
To address the catastrophic costs of drugs and long-term care, Canadians should be 
provided with incentives to purchase private insurance contracts. To encourage and support 
Canadians to save so as to have the capacity to self-insure for these predictable costs and/or 
to purchase private insurance coverage, the non-refundable Medical Expenses Tax Credit, 
and the refundable Medical Expenses Supplement could be changed to make out-of-pocket 
health-care costs eligible from the first dollar when funds for these costs are withdrawn 
from a registered savings vehicle. The federal tax expenditure under this revised credit and 
supplement could be covered by the elimination of the exemption of employer-provided 
health benefits from employee taxable income. Treating health benefits as taxable income 
subject to the modified Medical Expenses Tax Credit would address efficiency and equity 
issues with the existing tax treatments of health-care costs while extending tax assistance 
for out-of-pocket costs to more of the population. With decisions about payments for costs 
and purchases of insurance consumer-directed, incentives for quality improvement and cost 
containment are created. 
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APPENDIX: MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES  
AND COSTING BY PROVINCE FOR TABLE 1 OF REPORT
First, we wish to estimate the change in federal taxes collected if employee health and 
dental benefits were taxable benefits. These amounts may be inestimable with SPSD/M 
since employer-provided health benefits are not reported by individuals. Consequently, we 
rely on the tax-expenditure projections for the tax treatment of employee health and dental 
benefits from the Department of Finance for 2012 (non-taxable treatment) and 2013 (taxable 
but eligible for the METC).The box with “$2 billion” is taxing employee health benefits but 
treating them as eligible for the METC. That situation is a net gain for the government, as it 
reduces the $3.4 billion in the box directly above. 
Next, we estimate the change in federal tax expenditure if after-tax income used for out-
of-pocket health-care expenses were eligible for a modified METC. Case 1 below is the top 
row of the two, labelled “Taxable but eligible for modified METC, first $1,000 eligible”; this 
is the scenario we have been calling “the corridor”. Case 2 below is the bottom row of the 
two, labelled “Taxable but eligible for METC, first $2171 eligible”.
Case 1: The Corridor
The corridor estimates come from two distinct runs of the program which we refer to as 
“low spend” and “high spend”. These names refer to simulating changes in tax treatment of 
out-of-pocket health expenditures on either end of the corridor. 
The low spend scenario models those who would benefit under the new corridor regime by 
spending up to $1,000. To mimic this with the existing tax system, we replaced the actual 
amount of eligible medical spending with $1,000 if: 
a) An individual had $0 to $1,000 in medical spending; or
b) An individual had > $1,000 in medical spending but received no actual credits (because 
their income is too high).
Anyone else was given a value of $0 for medical spending. That means all the high 
spenders were treated like $0 spenders in the low spend scenario. 
This scenario is highly conservative. We are imagining that everyone who claimed $0 in 
medical spending actually claimed $1,000. Those who claimed a value greater than $0 were 
given extra spending to bring them to $1,000 (e.g., those with $800 were given $200). Those 
who claimed greater than $1,000 in the old regime and received nothing were given $1,000 
in credits under the corridor scheme. 
Since everyone now has an artificial total of $1,000 in medical spending, we ran the 
simulation so that medical expenses were eligible from the first dollar for the METC.
That left out the high spenders, so we ran the high spend scenario for them. Individuals 
who spent more than $1,000 on medical expenses and received credits in the old system 
would receive those credits plus $1,000 in the new corridor design. So we gave those people 
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$1,000 extra in eligible medical expenses and gave the people in the low spend scenario $0.
The overall impact of the corridor is the sum of the low spend and the high spend 
simulations. The difference between the status quo and the corridor (by province, in 
millions of dollars) is:
NFLD PEI NS NB QUE ONT MAN SASK ALTA BC CAN
Total tax change -13.6 4.1 -30.1 -20.8 -134.2 -593.6 -44 -28.8 -192.3 -180.4 -1233.7
Federal tax change -18.6 -0.9 -39.4 -29.5 -233.3 -684.4 -54 -42.8 -217.2 -215.6 -1535.7
Provincial tax change 5 5 9.3 8.8 99 90.8 10 13.8 24.8 35.2 302
The provincial tax change increasing is a function of provincial taxes in the low spend 
situation increasing by a large amount. We have no good explanation why the next change 
in provincial tax revenue would be positive, but we have a hypothesis. The SPSD/M is 
complicated and there is an entire part of the program simulating spending on commodities, 
basically taxed goods. When we give the low spenders an increase in medical spending of 
$1,000 that is interpreted by the SPSD/M as $1,000 more spent on medical goods, which in 
turn triggers additional simulation changes in an input-output model. 
Case 2: First-dollar eligible
This was easier to simulate: We gave everyone who had less than $1,000 in medical 
spending $1,000. Those who had more were left as is. Then, we made medical spending 
eligible from the first dollar. The difference between the status quo and the first-dollar 
eligible scenario with this conservative behavioural response (by province, in millions of 
dollars) is:
NFLD PEI NS NB QUE ONT MAN SASK ALTA BC CAN
Total tax change -34.9 -9.9 -65.8 -54.1 -568.3 -922.3 -84.9 -70.3 -292.8 -320.6 -2423.8
Federal tax change -35.9 -9.8 -66.7 -54.7 -470.6 -943.3 -83.1 -71.7 -292.9 -334.3 -2363
Provincial tax change 1 -0.1 1 0.6 -97.6 21 -1.8 1.3 0.1 13.7 -60.8
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http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/value-proposition-prevention-impacts-pure-north-s%E2%80%99energy-foundation%E2%80%99s-
preventive-care-progra
J.C. Herbert Emery | April 2016
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN EAST AFRICA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/survey-literature-local-content-policies-oil-and-gas-industry-east-africa
Chilenye Nwapi | April 2016
MAKE THE ALBERTA CARBON LEVY REVENUE NEUTRAL
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/make-alberta-carbon-levy-revenue-neutral
Kenneth McKenzie | April 2016
IT’S NOT JUST ABOUT BABY TEETH: PREVENTING EARLY CHILDHOOD CARIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-about-baby-teeth-preventing-early-childhood-caries
Jennifer Zwicker, Carolyn Dudley and Herbert Emery | April 2016
A MAJOR SETBACK FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS: CHANGING HOW FINANCIAL ADVISERS ARE COMPENSATED COULD HURT LESS-THAN-WEALTHY 
INVESTORS MOST
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/major-setback-retirement-savings-changing-how-financial-advisers-are-compensated-could-hurt-
Pierre Lortie | April 2016
THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE CONCERNING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA AND ELSEWHERE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/theory-and-evidence-concerning-public-private-partnerships-canada-and-elsewhere
Anthony Boardman, Matti Siemiatycki and Aidan Vining | March 2016
